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Abstract. Phishing over email continues to be a significant threat, as
these messages still end-up in users’ inboxes. Several studies showed that
users rarely check the URL in the statusbar before clicking a link and
that they have difficulties reading URLs. To support users, we propose
SMILE (Smart eMaIl Link domain Extractor), a novel approach that
provides the relevant information to distinguish between legitimate and
phishing emails. In most cases, the SMILE-string is the domain and top-
level-domain of the URL behind a link (e.g., “click here” in an authentic
Amazon email is modified to “click here [ amazon.com ]”).
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1 Introduction
Phishing is still a growing threat, e.g., the Anti Phishing Working Group [6]
shows that in 2020 the number of phishing websites doubled. Despite improved
SPAM filters, phishing emails still reach people’s email inboxes. While there are
various types of phishing emails, we focus on those containing dangerous links
that could download malware or take to phishing webpages. Simple phishing
emails can be detected through sender address or typos, but this is not enough
for sophisticated attacks. Yet, all phishing emails with links can be identified
through the URL behind the links. However, [26] showed that most people are not
aware of this and [3] demonstrated they have problems reading URLs correctly.
Researchers and security experts have proposed numerous solutions to sup-
port users, from various phishing awareness and training materials (e.g., in
[7, 20, 22, 23]) to security interventions in the form of tooltips appearing when
hovering the mouse over a link and containing the URL behind it [19,25].
We propose SMILE, Smart eMaIl Link domain Extractor. SMILE checks
an email HTML code to detect links and modifies them only to contain what
we call a “SMILE-string”. These strings are then the only clickable elements in
the respective email. They can be the link URL domain and top-level-domain
(TLD), an IP address, or include some subdomains (e.g., google.co.uk). This
paper explains how SMILE works.
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2 Related Works
There are various solutions to provide tool based anti-phishing support to users.
Tools can, e.g., analyse and operate on malicious emails/websites content [1,17,
28], work on the DNS side [4, 8, 11] or identify malicious websites with machine
learning [2,9,13]. They either block or warn users if the risk is above a predefined
threshold. Yet, there is no 100 % guarantee for detection. SMILE differs from
them as it does not stop phishing from reaching users’ email inboxes. It helps
users to identify those phishing emails that bypass spam filters and other tools.
Researchers have proposed in [5, 21, 25] two different solutions to support
users analyse emails URLs. In [19, 21, 25], the authors show a tooltip just-in-
time and just-in-place with the URL behind links. Some parts of SMILE, namely
the SMILE-string resolution and SMILE special cases (see Section 5), are based
on [21, 25]. In [5], the authors propose a chat-bot that helps users to decide the
legitimacy of a link through text interactions. SMILE advantage over them is
placing the relevant information (and only that) whenever an email is opened.
Valve’s videogame digital distribution service, STEAM, employs a SMILE-
like security feature on their forum. In [24] there are some examples of the
forum text formatting, however, we found no official documentation explaining
this security feature. Thus, we conducted some tests on their platform, shown in
Fig. 3 in the Appendix. Valve adds the relevant host parts of the URL after the
link itself, between square parenthesis, as normal text with darker font colour
and smaller character size. The feature only applies to non-URL-like textual
links, i.e., not starting with http/https, as no image nor shortened URLs are
allowed and URL-like links are not modified. SMILE, instead, modifies textual
links, URL-like (with and without protocol), image links and short URLs. More
importantly, SMILE moves the clickable element to the SMILE-string itself.
3 Background: Link-Types
Because our focus is on email links, we only consider the four main HTML
elements used for them:
– Anchor, also known as a-tag.
– Form, whose children “submit” attribute refers to the form “action” one.
– Formaction, special form-elements with the “formaction” attribute.
– Area-tag, enabling areas in a (possibly transparent) image to be clickable.
We would like to make these remarks: (1) although “link” usually indicates
only anchor-elements, for simplicity, in this paper we use it for all four types. (2)
JavaScript could also be used to include links. However, the common email clients
and web mail services [16] block JavaScript elements [10], e.g., Gmail, Outlook.
Therefore it is no further considered in this paper. (3) From the users’ point of
view, there is no difference between form-elements and formaction-elements.
There are three link-types for anchor-elements, form-elements, and formaction-
elements: Image, URL-like, and Misc (e.g., “Click here”). The area-tag is only
applicable for the link-type Image (as we consider its usage in the email context).
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In summary, SMILE needs to cope with ten different situations (= 3 anchor-
elements + 3 form-elements + 3 formaction-elements + 1 area-tag).
4 SMILE: General Idea
SMILE general idea is to enhance the transparency of every email link informa-
tion at once, substituting them with easy-to-read versions whenever the email
is opened without further user action. After applying SMILE, the email con-
tains text-based links with the SMILE-string. This can be the domain and the
TLD of the original link URL, an IP address, or include some subdomains (e.g.,
google.co.uk). The SMILE-string only provides the minimum information re-
quired to decide on a URL legitimacy (e.g., no automated URL analysis). Note,
the statusbar is left untouched and it shows the entire URL on mouse hover.
Our design principle has four reasons: (1) substituting every link at once saves
time, as users do not have to check them independently (e.g., as with a tooltip).
(2) Only placing the SMILE-string, instead of the URL, reduces the efficacy
of phishing URLs with misplaced legitimate domains. (3) The relevant security
indicator (SMILE-string) is in the email body, i.e., just-in-place, as recommended
in [19]. (4) Limited information prevents conflicts/overlap with other tools, e.g.,
the solution in [25]: users wanting more information can combine SMILE with
other tools; otherwise, they already posses the minimum information required
to decide. An example of an email modified by SMILE is shown in Fig. 1.
Toggle Function. SMILE might make complex emails unreadable. Thus, we
implemented a toggle function to undo all substitutions on demand.
(a) Without SMILE (b) With SMILE
Fig. 1: Link in email, without and with SMILE.
5 SMILE: Algorithm
A high-level description of the algorithm is depicted in Fig. 2. Note, the credit for
the processes described in “Resolve SMILE-string” (short URL service, redirects,
IP-address, legitimate TLDs recognition and punycode) and “Resolve special case
SMILE-string” (programmed tooltips and dangerous files at cloud services) goes
to the authors of [21, 25]. However, differently from TORPEDO, SMILE: (1)
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only shows the SMILE-string, not the entire URL, (2) adds the SMILE-string
to the email text, not in a tooltip, (3) substitutions are situation based, and (4)
substitutions are shown whenever the email is opened, not only on mouse hover.
Fig. 2: Flow chart showing the algorithm behind SMILE.
Identify link-type. First, SMILE searches for a link and identifies the link-
type (see Section 3 for the different link-types).
Resolve SMILE-string. SMILE extracts the URL from the link and checks
if it points to a known short URL service or a known redirect service. In these
cases, the URL is meaningless to the user to determine whether it is a phishing
one or not. SMILE resolves the final destination, if needed by repeatedly applying
this step. Then, the resolved URL is set as actual URL.
For the short URL service, SMILE sends a request to the address without
following the location in the “HTTP 3xx” server responses. Thus, the target
website is not loaded and the users are not at security risk. However, some users
may consider it a privacy risk. Therefore, users can configure SMILE to not send
any request and to show domain and TLD of the short URL service.
For the redirects, SMILE resolves the URL from the path of the actual URL
applying rules that recognise the structure used by known redirect services.
For example, from google.de/url?url=https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Fdocs
to https://example.com/docs.
Afterwards, SMILE extracts the host from the URL and checks whether its
host is an IP address, i.e., IPv4 or IPv6. In this case, the SMILE-string is the
complete IP address and SMILE stops processing it.
In case the URL host is not an IP address, SMILE deduces from it the SMILE-
string by considering the host domain and TLD. The information regarding
actual TLDs comes from the Mozilla Foundation’s Public Suffix list [18] using
the solution in the ”publicsuffixlist.js” GitHub project [14].
Finally, SMILE checks the extracted SMILE-string for specific characters in
the Unicode character space. This check is to prevent homographic techniques,
i.e., using similar-looking characters from other character spaces in the domain
or TLD, e.g., using a Cyrillic “e” for the domain “google.de”. SMILE replaces
non-ASCII characters in the SMILE-string with puny code, e.g., xn–googl-7of.de.
This approach is already used in many programs, e.g., Google Chrome 51+ [12].
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Resolve special case SMILE-string. SMILE addresses three special cases:
(1) programmed tooltips, (2) dangerous files at cloud services and (3) website
creation and hosting tools.
In the first case, the tooltip contains the legitimate URL for the link and is
meant to distract users from the actual URL in the statusbar. If users do not
know that a tooltip is not expected in a context, they can mistakenly consider
the URL in the tooltip as a legitimate location, thus clicking on a fraudulent link.
SMILE checks for programmed tooltips and blocks them from being displayed.
In the second case, phishers would store dangerous files at a cloud service
and provide a link to them in the email. In this case, the SMILE-string alone
might be misleading to users. Therefore, SMILE checks for the URL structure
of well known cloud service providers (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive).
It then adds a warning before the SMILE-string link: “[Only click if you were
expecting this email, as you are redirected to a cloud service:]”.
In the third case, SMILE checks for well known website creation and hosting
tools, e.g., Google Sites, Microsoft Azure. The SMILE string is then extended
with the subdomain (e.g., sites.google.com) and a warning is added before the
SMILE-string link: “[Only click if you were expecting this email, as you are
redirected to a webpage that could have been set up by anyone:]”.
Apply situation specific substitution + normalise visuals. Each of
the 10 situations identified in Section 3, is treated differently by SMILE:
– Image link-type. A link including an image as its first and only child. SMILE
adds the phrase “Image link:” above the image, followed by the SMILE-string
between square parenthesis.
– URL-like link-type. A text link containing a domain or a text appearing to
be a URL. SMILE detects specific patterns (i.e., http, https, www, /) or a
specific structure (i.e., domain.tld1). SMILE substitutes the text content of
the element with the SMILE-string.
– Misc link-type. Links whose content is neither an image nor URL-like, e.g.,
“Click here”. To preserve the information in the misc type text, SMILE keeps
the text but disables the link, i.e., it is just normal email text. SMILE adds
the SMILE-string between square brackets as a new link right after this text.
These three link-types cover 9 of the 10 situations. The last situation are
maps with clickable areas over images. SMILE adds a list of links above the
image, analogously to the Image link-type described above. The map is then
removed from the image to disable the clickable parts. This approach loses the
original image area contextual information, but introduces a clear list of links.
Code examples in HTML for each situation are provided in the Appendix
(Table 2). Examples of the substitutions can be seen in Table 1.
SMILE also normalises the font visuals. For example, it applies a minimum
font size to prevent a too small to read SMILE-string and it checks for enough
contrast with the background colour to make the SMILE-string easily legible.
1 Thereby, SMILE recognises both extended URLs, e.g., https://www.amazon.co.uk,
and reduced ones, e.g., amazon.co.uk, amazon.co.uk/myprofile.
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Table 1: Examples of SMILE substitutions. Note, SMILE also works on buttons
and button-like links, i.e., images of buttons and CSS modified anchor-elements.
6 Discussion
SMILE can work on both the receiving email server (central approach) or the
email client, i.e., the software or app used by the user (local approach).
A central approach makes SMILE available on mobile devices and it is con-
venient for the user, as no installation is required. However, the toggle function
is either not available or users have to install an extension. This approach also
causes issues with the DKIM authentication method, as the latter uses digital
signatures over the email header and body and any alteration leads to a client-
side check failure. A partial solution is for the receiving server to perform the
DKIM check and pass it on to the user, e.g., by changing the subject accordingly.
Moreover, end-to-end encryption mechanisms, e.g., PGP or S/MIME, cannot be
used, as the substitution can be applied only to a plain text.
A local approach works with both DKIM authentication, and end-to-end
encryption. The toggle function is also active. However, SMILE needs to be
adapted to the various email clients as an extension (i.e., add-on). Note, both
Outlook and Apple Mail, as well as mobile clients, require specific solutions.
As future work, we plan an evaluation of the SMILE concept, i.e., its effec-
tiveness in different settings (e.g., mobile and desktop) as well as its performance
in comparison to the tooltip proposed in [25]. This could be conducted in two
ways: in a non-interactive environment and in an interactive environment. Both
approaches have been used in the past (e.g., [15,20,25,27] used a non-interactive
environment and [5,25] used an interactive one). We believe both options to be
worthwhile and plan to evaluate SMILE in both. Furthermore, we want to check
SMILE in the real world to see how much the toggle function is required.
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7 Conclusion
We propose SMILE, a new security intervention to support users while detecting
phishing emails. SMILE has various advantages over exiting approaches: (1) it
displays the relevant information immediately, not only on mouse-over. (2) It
only shows the SMILE-string, thwarting obfuscation techniques like subdomain-
as-domain (e.g., google.com.some-domain.org). (3) It can work centrally (i.e., on
the receiving email server) or locally (i.e., in the email client).
As future work, we plan to conduct user studies to get empirical evidence of
these advantages and evaluate SMILE usability.
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[ <button type="submit">example.org</button> ]






<input value="Submit Now" type="submit"/></form>
<form action="https://sub.example.com/path"
method="POST">↪→
Submit Now [ <button
type="submit">example.org</button> ]↪→

































































Area Link: [ <a
href="https://example1.com/">example1.com</a> ]<br>↪→
Area Link: [ <a
href="https://example2.com/">example2.com</a> ]<br>↪→
<img src="./example.png"/>
Table 2: Examples in html code for every substitution situation. The formaction-
attribute for the input and button is optional. If no formaction-attribute is given,
the action-attribute of the form is used.
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Fig. 3: Tests of Valve’s STEAM forum formatting of links. The substitution is
added only for some of them. T31, 32 and 33 use the “spoiler” function, that
allows to obscure some of the text, then visible only through mouse hover.
